King George V vs. North Carolina, a question that reveals a lot about the design and intentions behind the first modern post-treaty battleships of the United Kingdom and United States. In this article, we will examine some of the features behind both ships and see how they compare to one another. Without further delay, let’s begin.
In the mid-1930s, both Britain and the United States committed their navies to building their first new classes of battleship since the ‘Washington Treaty’ of 1922. The ships that emerged – the five-strong British King George V‘s and the United States’ two-ship North Carolina class – were superficially different, not least because the US ships carried nine 16-inch guns to the British ten 14-inch. Yet in other respects these ships were remarkably similar. This reflected their origins in the inter-war ‘Treaty’ system, beginning with the ‘Washington Treaty’ of 1922 which limited new battleships to 16-inch guns on a defined ‘standard’ displacement of 35,000 tons. It also enforced a battleship building ‘holiday’, with the exception of two new British ships. The scale restrictions on battleships were retained in 1930 when a follow-up limitation treaty was signed in London. That too came up for renewal mid-decade, by which time new battleships were required. Britain – at the urging of Treasury officials – pushed for smaller (cheaper) battleships, but this did not suit United States officials concerned about Japanese ambitions. Meanwhile, Japan pulled out of discussions.
HMS King George V. Drawing by Bombhead, via Shipbucket, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
The outcome was that the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936 restricted main gun calibre to 14-inch, but retained the 35,000 ton displacement limit. [1] A clause in the fourth article permitted main armament to revert to 16-inch if Japan refused to ratify the agreement by 1 April 1937.[2] Nobody expected they would, but the timetable tangled with the timing of the new British and US battleships. As a result, both nations prepared designs featuring a dozen 14-inch guns in quad mountings, on 35,000 ton hulls with similar speed of around 27-28 knots. The 14-inch limit was obviously going to change. However, because of the way fiscal authorisation and lead-times intersected, both Britain and the United States had to get designs finalised before the ‘escalator clause’ could be invoked. Both governments were also determined to adhere to the letter of the treaty. This meant 14-inch guns. It was, however, possible to structure a ship in such a way that quad 14-inch mounts could be swapped for triple 16-inch at a late stage in the design process – or during early construction – without upsetting the weight calculations. This potential was built in to the designs for the North Carolina class.[3]
The British did not do so, as we saw in the last article, primarily because the Director of Naval Construction calculated that including the option for 16-inch guns would increase the citadel weights, pushing their ship over the displacement limit. Compromising protection to reduce the weight was dismissed.[4] A late-design review of King George V by the Board of Admiralty then increased the required armour, forcing a revision that dropped two of the 14-inch guns. [5] But there were also issues procuring 16-inch guns: Britain lacked the capacity to get the detailed engineering drawings completed in time,[6] and industry had deteriorated to the point where it could produce only seven heavy mountings annually. [7]
So – how do the two classes stack up? In this, the service qualities of battleships – like all warships – were defined by more than the raw numbers of armament, armour and speed. Other factors, often specified by the relevant naval authorities, included range, sea-keeping, speeds at particular loads and states of hull-fouling, maintainability, on-board supplies, ammunition, auxiliary equipment, and all the myriad other things that made a warship function in its intended role. The main guiding parameters were displacement – which broadly guided just how much could be built into the ship – and the role expected of the ship by each nation.
USS North Carolina, 1941, by Ian Roberts. Via Shipbucket, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Main armament
Both ships carried new-generation heavy guns. However, North Carolina’s armament was far more powerful by virtue of the conversion to 16-inch/45 calibre weapons.[8] Did this matter militarily? As we saw in an earlier article, the guns of the King George V class met the tasks required of them. And so did those of North Carolina: the USS Washington destroyed IJN Kirishima as a viable fighting unit in just seven minutes near Guadalcanal in November 1942.[9]
Secondary armament and anti-aircraft guns
Both ships carried the same style of secondary armament, dual-purpose mounts that had anti-surface and anti-aircraft capability. This marked a change from earlier single-purpose armament. The British weapons, at 5.25-inch, did not prove as handy as the US 5-inch weapons, in part because the heavier shell was difficult to handle. Both were given good anti-aircraft armament by late-1930s standards when they were designed. In both cases, this was substantially increased on the back of war experience.
Propulsion
There was little to choose between the practical sea speed of King George V and North Carolina. Both were designed around similar horsepower: 110,000 in the British case and 121,000 in the US.[10] This reflected a similar intended speed of 27-28 knots, defined after early work on both sides of the Atlantic which looked at ships of up to 30 knots.[11] However, both navies concluded this would unbalance designs of 35,000 tons. In service, the North Carolina was typically capable of 27-28 knots,[12] the King George V a little over 28;[13] but the difference was academic. US propulsion efficiencies were, however, superior to those of the British, built around double-reduction gears and relatively high-pressure steam systems, pioneered in the USS Mahan of 1933.[14]
USS North Carolina in heavy seas, 1944. Public domain, via Wikipedia.
Armour
The British ship was more heavily armoured than the US, with a good immunity zone against 16-inch fire on the basis that this was the likely armament of potential opponents. The ship was also optimised to fight at what the Admiralty regarded as likely battle-ranges of 12 to 16,000 yards.[15] North Carolina, by contrast, was optimised against 14-inch fire, on the principle that balanced ships should be armoured against their own main armament. In battle against a 16-inch armed opponent her immunity zone was narrow.[16] Neither armour system was significantly tested in battle. Prince of Wales’ engagement with Bismarck lasted only a few minutes;[17] Scharnhorst‘s 11.1-inch guns were well within the capacity of Duke of York’s protection system – and in any event the German vessel only scored superficial hits before the British battleship took out two thirds of her main armament. And Washington destroyed the 14-inch gunned Kirishima’s fighting power so swiftly that the Japanese could not fight back in any meaningful way.
The armour design of each class was different. Both focused on substantial horizontal protection, carried higher than in First World War style designs, as protection both against plunging shells and bomb. However, the US ship carried side armour on a 15-degree sloping belt, which meant a lighter belt could be carried for the same protection.[18] The British had abandoned this principle, accepting the weight penalty of a thicker vertical external belt. This was largely due to concerns that shell fragments could be deflected to pass below a sloped internal armour system, particularly as the ship moved in a seaway.[19] Issues with repairing an internal belt and asymmetric flooding if the shell plating was damaged outboard of the belt, also existed; but were apparently lesser concerns. Again, it was a question of balancing advantages and risks. Designers on both sides of the Atlantic were aware of the issues, and the solutions each found reflected differing philosophies
Unrefuelled range
North Carolina was designed with Pacific operations in mind and had a design endurance of about 17,450 miles at 15 knots.[20] One of the main problems of the King George V class was their comparatively short range, caused in part by the way that oil storage was built in to the anti-torpedo systems. This led to unexpected wastage, compounded by the fact that their propulsion system was not economical.[21] When steaming in company with North Carolina in 1942, the King George V was found to use 39 percent more fuel than the US vessel.
In a sense it was understandable: the King George V class had heavier armour, meaning there was going to be a compromise elsewhere. Fuel capacity was part of the balancing act involved in battleship design, where armour, munitions stowage, range at particular speeds, fire-power and sea speed at a defined ship-condition (typically displacement, water temperature and fouling) all formed part of a juggling act with other considerations such as infrastructure limits, habitability, supplies (including potable/feed water reserves), further framed by financial limits and political decisions. All had effect, one way or another, in the final balance of any detailed design.
Anti-torpedo protection
Both ships were designed with multi-layer underwater torpedo defence.[22] However, neither system was wholly satisfactory. The first commander of North Carolina moved 165 berths on the basis that he considered the system inadequate and expected the third deck to rupture, venting torpedo blast into the berthing space.[23] Actual experience suggested these concerns were reasonably founded. When North Carolina was hit by a Japanese submarine torpedo on 15 August 1942, the system worked, although nearly 1000 tons of water flooded into the ship. However, later analysis indicated that the system had come close to failure, risking a magazine detonation.[24] By the same token, however, the British system also had problems. There is evidence that the Prince of Wales’ underwater protective system failed under aerial torpedo attack which should have been within its capacity, though there were other factors.[25] As always, a complex engineering system such as a ship will fail in complex ways. The reasons for the loss of Prince of Wales have been extensively analysed elsewhere.[26]
Radar fire-control
The British fitted an early maritime radar to a warship in 1936, and pushed ahead with systems for surface detection, air warning and fire-control.[27] The US battleship did not include radar in its original design.[28] However, radar was under development in the US, and in service, both King George V and North Carolina classes were fitted with various search and fire-control radars, updated as new models became available. In both cases, the fire-control radar was highly effective, evidenced by Washington’s spectacular radar-controlled performance at night against Kirishima; and Duke of York’s accurate radar-controlled fire against KM Scharnhorst.[29]
‘Teething troubles’
Both classes suffered from problems in early service. The British issues were more serious: the main armament malfunctioned. This was traced to two major issues and many small detail problems. It turned out that the roller-paths on which the quad turrets revolved flexed with normal ship movement, made worse in heavier seas. This jammed the turrets and prevented them training. The ammunition hoists were also found to have been built to tolerances that were too tight, leading to jams. All this was correctable. However, the US ships were also not trouble-free; one early problem was vibration when full engine power was applied. Again, this was correctable. In both cases the issues gained prominence because the ships, the British particularly, had to be thrown into war service quickly, making it difficult to put them through the lengthy troubleshooting and correction processes normal to peace-time.
Seakeeping
The North Carolina was better at sea-keeping than the British vessels, which had to incorporate a Board of Admiralty requirement for zero-elevation fire from A turret, coupled with reductions in freeboard during design. The King George V‘s were always wet forward, even in moderate seas.
HMS Duke of York showing how the lack of bow flare caused problems even in moderate seas.
General structure and construction
The North Carolina had a dramatic advantage over King George V in general construction. Financial restrictions meant that large parts of the British ships had to be made of mild steel, whereas the US vessels made extensive use of STS (‘special treatment steel’).[30] This was more expensive, but made North Carolina’s overall structure far more resistant to damage. The British could afford to use their equivalent, Ducol steel and its variants, only in limited quantities.
Conclusions
To sum up, then, apart from the clear differences in fire-power, the King George V and North Carolina classes were surprisingly similar overall. Both had similar design displacement and design speeds of around 27-28 knots. Neither ship could fit all desirable military characteristics into the displacement, and the compromises reflected differing philosophies on both sides of the Atlantic as much as industrial and timing limits. King George V mounted 14-inch guns and had a good immunity zone against 16-inch shells; whereas North Carolina mounted 16-inch guns and a good immunity zone against 14-inch shells. Neither managed to fit both 16-inch guns and protection against that armament into the displacement, although US designers were working on that too, and succeeded with their next battleship class.
Where the British ship fell down was in un-refuelled range, a major issue which, in 1941, threatened the King George V’s pursuit of Bismarck.[31] The North Carolina also drew a general advantage from superior US industrial capacity, design resources, naval support infrastructure and financial position. This paid off in terms of the extensive use of special treatment steel in the structure, in a superior propulsion plant which offered significant fuel efficiencies by comparison with British systems, and in the fact that the US had the capacity to up-gun the ships during construction. The greater scale of US resource and facilities also framed all other matters associated with building and supporting such a complex system as a major warship. The British, who were beset with severe financial, industrial and infrastructure limitations, could not match the US in these matters and had to accept compromises.
To this extent, the two North Carolinas – the name-ship, and Washington – were better ships. However, in terms of ability to achieve the results required by their respective navies over the span of the Second World War, there was not a huge amount to choose between them in a general military sense. Once early ‘teething troubles’ were resolved, both designs essentially did what was asked of them.
For more on naval history, check out my book The Battlecruiser New Zealand: a Gift to Empire. Click to buy.
Also check out my article on King George V.
Copyright © Matthew Wright 2018
Notes
[1] Detailed in Norman Friedman, The British Battleship 1906-46, Seaforth, Barnsley, 2015, pp. 294-295.
[2] Naval Limitation Treaty (Second London Naval Treaty) of 25 March 1936, Part 2 Article 4 (2), text at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-0257.pdf.
[3] William H. Garzke and R. O. Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, Macdonald and Janes, London, 1976, p. 34.
[4] William H. Garzke and Robert O. Dulin, Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch Battleships of World War II, Jane’s Publishing Company, London, p. 176.
[5] Ibid, p. 175.
[6] Garzke and Dulin, British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, pp. 176-177.
[7] Friedman, The British Battleship 1906-46, p. 407, n. 25.
[8] For comparison see Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, pp. 47-49.
[9] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 46.
[10] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 65.
[11] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p.28; Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, p. 170.
[12] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 65.
[13] Norman Friedman, The British Battleship 1906-46, Seaforth, Barnsley, 2015, p. 313.
[14] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 56.
[15] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, p. 173.
[16] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 52.
[17] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, pp. 180-190.
[18] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 52.
[19] Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, p. 230.
[20] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 65.
[21] Garzke and Dulin, British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, pp 339-340.
[22] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 64.
[23] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 61.
[24] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, pp. 38-39.
[25] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, p. 203.
[26] See, e.g. Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, pp. 196-209.
[27] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, p. 235.
[28] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: United States Battleships of World War II, p. 56.
[29] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch battleships of World War II, pp. 218-220.
[30] http://www.navweaps.com/index_nathan/metalprpsept2009.php#U.S._Carnegie_Corp._Special_Treatment_Steel_%28STS%29_Armor%2FConstruction_Steel, accessed 1 September 2018.
[31] Garzke and Dulin, Battleships: British, Soviet, French and Dutch Battleships of World War II, p. 209.